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Chapter 6
The Relevance of Irrelevance
in Mimetic Narratives
Raphaël Baroni
In this chapter, I shall argue for a "7ocal" form of relevance theory (RT),
highlighting specific constraints linked to two general types of narrative that
I consider opposed in function and design. My main claim will be that some
narratives, which I shall call "mimetic" or "intriguingi' are designed to fulfill
a specific purpose that invalidates almost all basic principles guiding ordinary
language use, while others, which I shall call "configuring," respect those
principles, because they are designed to bring clarity and convey knowledge
concerning past events. Based on this distinction, I consider it impossible to
define what is relevant and what is not with reference only to some general
principles, supposedly valid for all kinds of narrative discourse, as is often
presupposed in relevance theory as well as in narratology.
However, before dealing with this problem on a theoretical level, I need
to give a concrete illustration of the issues that I aim to discuss here. I shall
intentionally not give the context of the following example, but I guess one
can infer it from the discourse:
Hi dad! Guess what . . . Mother had a terible accident today! Oh! by the way,
I'm calling you from the hospital. Anyway, let's start my story with the begin-
ning. You remember when we woke up this morning. It was raining outside and
mother had to take the car to go to work. Despite the weather, she looked so
cheerful in her beautiful red dress, having no idea of what would happen next.
She heard on the radio that there was a lot of traffic on the highway. So, she
thought she would save some time by taking the bridge over the Hudson River.
But you know, the visibility is tenible at this time of the year and the road was
very slippery on this bloody bridge. Then . . . well, somy! I have to hang up,
there's a lot going on around here. I'll call you back in an hour or two. Bye dad!
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Interpretations of this short piece will differ completely according to the narra-
tive genre identified by the audience. Ifone sees the story as some kind ofjoke
(let's say a Monty Python gag), he or she might find it quite funny, because
it seems absurd that the son does not give the father the crucial information
he is doubtless waiting for, namely: what is Mother's present condition? We
infer from the genre that the tension between the expected information and its
deferral would probably devastate the father, but it produces on the audience
an anxiety blended with pleasure-a kind of enjoyable suspense. The cliff'-
hanger of the story's ending, associated with the unsolved mystery concerning
the health of the mother, is a meaninglÏl frustration. We are simply dealing
here with an open ending that can be interpreted as a surprising conclusion,
and we must admit that surprise is a good way to end a joke. Even the "red
dress" should not be considered a useless detail. In faû, it is a crucial element
of the story: it delays information in order to frustrate the audience, but it also
helps the audience visualize the scene and immerse in its simLrlated reality.
So, the red dress has a function in the story: Baûhes would probably consider
it a "catalysis" (1975,24849), or a diegetic element designed to achieve a
"reality effect" (1989, 14148).It increases the reader's empathy, postpones
the resolution, and reinforces the dramatic effect of the scene.
On the other hand, if the text were the transcription of a real conversation,
the narration would obviously transgress almost all conventions guiding a
form of communication whose aim is to convey information as efflciently as
possible. The most important items of information should have been given
first, not adjourned to another conversation. We would expect the son to begin
with what might be considered a spoiler if it were fiction. Something like:
"Hi! Mom is alright, but she had a terrible accident today." Also, a detail like
"she looked so cheerful in her beautiful red dress" would be superfluous, even
scandalous in this context. According to the Gricean maxims (Grice 1989), the
discourse might be true, but it violates all the other maxims: it is not as infor-
mative as is required for the purpose of the exchange, it is overly prolix and
disordered, and some story elements, like the red dress, are simply irrelevant.
The only way to interpret this conversation, if it were real, would be to infer
that the son had sadistic intentions or some kind of sociopathic disorder.
The same text can, therefore, be considered relevant or irrelevant according
to the frame we use to interpret it. Moreover, our inferences concerning the
intentions of the narrator rely on textual as well as contextual inf'ormation,
especially knowledge of the genre and speech situation.r In fact, every reader
can infer a context from my example, but in this artiflcial situation neither
genre nor context can be determined with certainty, and the ambiguity can be
resolved only if we have access to the real context of a real discourse' Actu-
ally, as long as it remains an artificial example, both interpretations are from
a narratological point of view equally false, because the real relevance of a
text must be linked to iïs real context, and real contoxt includes the intentions
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guiding the real proù,tcer of the narrative. The same applies to my own inten-
tions here: the reader should understand that the story I cite above is intended
to illustrate the dependence of relevance theory on the context of discursive
interaction involved in a specific text. In this artificial case, what matters is
not simply the intentions of the narrator but the intentions of the author who
communicates implicitly behind the narrator's back.
what defines relevance in a narrative pertains, additionally, not only to what
is being told but also to how itis told. In other words, when applying relevance
theory to a nanation, we are not only concerned with the tellabitity of the story,
its eventfulness, newsworthiness, or completeness: it is equally important to
relate the story content to the way it conveys information. In some cases, feel-
ings of suspense, curiosity, or surprise can be considered the real core of the
narrative, or even the basic function of narrativitf. However, in other cases-
for example, when we share some hot news in a conversation or on information
media-we expect that the nanator will avoid creating narrative tension. when
the tension is already inherent in the context, our only concern is to understand
as clearly as possible and as quickly as possible whât happened in order to
resolve our anxiety.3 Therefore, a chronological narration may not necessarily
be the most relevant way of telling a story, because this form of rinear progres-
sion usually arouses suspense, which may well not suit the type of situation
described. TVhen the audience needs to know the result of an unexpected event
first, the Gricean maxim "be orderly" should be understood as: 'oDon't respect
the chronology of the events; don't start your story from the beginning; give
first what you consider to be the most impoftant information." william Labov
and Joshua waletzky (1967) have shown that oral narratives usually require an
abstract in the opening sequence, and this may even be a preliminary condition
for being allowed to begin a narration at all.
Before giving a more precise account of what might be called a,,local"
relevance theory specifically designed for mimetic narratives, the main con-
vergences and divergences between narratology and relevance theory must be
clarif,ed; for there are not only opportunities but also risks and chailenges, in
seeking to mix two different theoretical traditions.
Relevance theory shares some fundamental epistemological principles with
recent narrative theory, especially if we consider how the latter has evolved
since its formalist heyday. on the one hand, as stated by Sperber and wilson,
Relevance theory may be seen as an attempt to work out in detail one of Grice's
central claims: that an essential feature of most human communication, both
verbal and non-verbal, is the expression and recognition of intentions.
CONVERGENCES
In developing this claim, Grice laid the foundations for an inferential model of
communication, an alternative to the classical code model. (Sperber and Wilson
2002,249)
This approach has proved particularly useful for deciphering the workings of
irony, implied meaning, and other figures of indirect communication that can-
not be explained otherwise. On the other hand, naratology has experienced
a parallel evolution: for the structuralist pioneers, authorial intention and
discursive communication seemed out of the perimeter of their investigation,
but later, narrative theory has also undergone a "pragmatic revolution," firstly
by exploring the principles guiding "narrative cooperation" in the context of
"reception theory" (Eco 1979). Thus, as stated by Umberto Eco, the "fabula
is the result of a continuous series of abductions made during the course of
the reading" (1979,31), and the text must consequently be considered alazy
machine that requires the bold cooperation of the reader in order to fill the gaps
in the narrative world (Eco 1985, 29).ln this sense recent cognitivist models
consider the story not simply as encoded by the author and then decoded by
the reader, but as an unstable matrix of virtualities progressively elaborated in
the readers' mind through a complex network of inferential procedures.
Secondly, for rhetorical nanatology, readerly progression can be coupled
with an investigation of the effects the author seeks to achieve, for example,
to preserve the interest of the story, to deal with ethical issues, or to create
irony.a It is in this context that, following Wayne C. Booth, rhetorical nar-
ratologists have investigated the communication between an "implied author"
and her or his "authorial readers." Just as in relevance theory, they also con-
sider that interpretation is channeled by recognition of an implied intention.
Karin Kukkonen has recently highlighted the connection between the rhe-
torical interpretation of "unreliable nanation" and relevance theory:
Booth sees unreliable narration as an instance of irony, in which the (implied)
author and the reader communicate behind the nattator's back. . . . Uncoopera-
tive nanation can be seen as a mimetic representation of someone breaking the
maxims of communication and 'Jeopardizing the CP" (Prutt 1977, 2\7)' As a
mimetic representation in literary narrative, breaking the maxims contributes
to the characterization of the nanator, while the actual Cooperative Principle
between the reader and the author remains intact. (209)
I was using relevance theory in a similar way when I suggested that the story of
the accident, ifidentified as fictional, must be understood either as ajoke or as
a meaningful illustration of a theoretical problem involving not only a sadistic
narrator but also an ironic author, We may conclude that an irrelevant speech
act on the level of \hefabula may nevertheless be considered a relevant speech
act with reference to the implied communication between author and audience,
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Another factor that helped build bridges between relevance theory and nar_
ratology was a methodological shift. Relevance theory was mainly focused
on everyday communication, while narrative theory, in its classicâl period,
was generally confined to the analysis of fiction, with a strong emphasis on
the poetics of decontextualized literary works. But, beginnirig in the mid_
1970s, there have been growing attempts to widen the ùope ù narratology
to an investigation of the bonds between what was labeled ,,natural narra-
tives" and their "artificial" siblings, This led to the more recent development
of what Monika Fludernik (1996) has called "natural naratology,,: a theory
encompassing oral as well as literary narratives, and any otner kino of media
that can elicit the construction of a storyworld.
Teun van Dijk (1975) and Mary Louise pratt (1977) pioneered rhis evolu-
tion by insisting on the common features of natural and artificial narratives,
Most importantly, they based their reflections on the assumption that (using
the words of philosopher Gregory currie) "narratives are inientionally fash-
ioned devices of representation that work by manifesting the communica-
tive intention of their makers" (2010, xvii). For linguisis like Labov and
waletzky, it was obvious that conversational narratives have to do with issues
like "evaluation devices," "tellability," or "point," because it is simply impos-
sible to describe narrative structures without tinking them to thè function
they play in discursive interaction. In the structuralist paradigm, however, it
was far from obvious that the same was true for literary r*ks for Roland
Barthes, who declared the death of the author, texts were autonomous fiom
their context of production.s one of the main concerns of Mary Louise pratt,
when she applied the cooperative principle (cp) to literary àir"ou.r", *u,
to challenge this idea and to close the gap between artificial and natural
narratives: "Far from being autonomous, self-contained, self-motivating,
context-free objects which exist independently from the ,pragmatic, concerns
of'everyday' discourse, literary works take place in a càntàxt, and like any
other utterance they cannot be described apart from that context', (rg77, ll5i.
Nevertheless, Jim Fanto underlines that
Pratt's . . . application of Grice's theory to literature considerably extends the
use intended by the speech act philosopher. she proposes that the Maxims count
as genre rules for whatever type ofdiscourse the flctional narrator is producing.
when the narrator violates a Maxim, the reader must . , . interpret this act as an
intentional flouting on the author,s part. (197g, 136)
It is therefore a question of taking the measure of the reorganization
implied by this extension of relevance theory, and of evaluating how it
must be reformulated in order to take account of the specificities ofmimetic
narratives.
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"natural versus the artificial." As an alternative, I propose a dichotomy oppos-
ing the "intriguing function" typically associated with mimetic narratives to
the "configuring function" that we find in other kinds of narrative representa-
tions (Baroni 2009, 27, 45-94). This opposition is based on the terminology
Paul Ricæur uses in his analysis of the functions of emplotment in Temps et
récit (1983-1985). I adopt this terminology in order to contradicr the mislead-
ing conception of a supposed convergence in "emplotment" and "configura*
tion" that often verges on the synonymous. Unlike Ricæur (1983-1985),6 I
would contend that narrative organization does ruot usually follow the same
rules in historical books and in fictions. These two forms of discourse are not
designed in the same way, because, functionally speaking, they are not meant
to have the same effect on their audience.
Many factual narratives are intended to give a transparent and comprehen-
sive representation of past events, and to do so, they need to maximize the
concordanceT of the representation, even when there is some unintentional
limitation in the available sources of information. In contrast, most fictional
narratives (but not only these) are intended to puzzle the audience, to imitate
or simulate the rough experience of a character immersed in the storyworld,
and to do so, they need, at least temporarily, to maximize the discordance of
the representation, As stated by Juan Prieto-Pablos:
As recipients of a verbal message, we expect it to be transmitted promptly and
clearly, in accordance with the principles of conversational cooperation out-
lined by Grice . . .; if the message is to be of a certain length, we expect to be
given a summary or abstract with the essential pieces of infomation, so that we
can put all the pieces in the rest of the message together . . . Underlying these
practices or expectations, there is a basic need to control the conditions of the
fransmission and reception of information. The kind of delay or concealment of
information featured in suspense texts challenges this basic need and naturally
produces anxiety. (1998, 100)
Accordingly, some narratives use summaries or abstracts, not only in our
daily conversations but also, for example, in newspaper articles, or in other
kinds of narrative communication where stories are addressed to an impatient
reader. I will call these "configuring" narratives, because their main narrative
purpose is to configure knowledge, to build an explanation concerning an
event in a way that the processing of the information requires minimum effort
from the addressee.
In the case of mimetic narratives-which are mostly fictions, but may
also include autobiographies, autofiction, literary journalism, or vivid
conversational anecdotes-we do not expect to receive straight informa-
tion concerning events; we want to immerse ourselves in a dimension of
Despite obvious convergences, there are enduring divergences between rel-
evance theory and narrative theory, simply because some principles guiding
ordinary language use do not fit the speciflc case of mimetic narratives. To
begin with, it is obvious that the veracity of a narrative becomes irrelevant in
most fictions. For instance, if the story of the accident is considered fictional,
the question of its truth or falsehood will not arise, because the discourse does
not consist of serious-in the sense of "factual"-assertions. This situation
lifts a lot of the pathos from the narrative, or finds interest precisely in this
pathos, whose value is converted from negative to positive. As noticed by
Teun van Dijk: "First of all, artificial narratives need not respect a number
of pragmatic conditions. Well known is the fact that such narratives need not
be true, although they may be true" (1975,291)' Most importantly, as we
have already seen, the fictional nature of artificial naratives opens the pos-
sibility of a multilayered channel of communication, since an uncooperative
naïïator may conceal the ironical intentions of an implied author. Neverthe-
less, mimetic narratives can also be factual, or even conversational: the main
differences do not concern the content of the story but the way it is told. As
stated by Jim Fanto: "When Grice formulated his Maxims and CP, he had
in mind a conversation in which the parlicipants intend to communicate the
maximal amount of informatioru about the real world as fficiently as possible.
He did not, however, rule out other purposes for other discourse" (1978, I 35).
"Mary Pratt," Fanto continues, "proposed a purpose for natural and literary
narratives that differentiates them from other kinds oflanguage" (135), which
is why she had to widen the scope of the original CP and replace the general
maxims with "special maxims." More generally, this form of communication
was seen to contradict one of the most basic principles of the televance theory
later developed by Sperber and Wilson: "In relevance-theoretic terms, other
things being equal, the greater lhe processing effort required, the less relevant
the input will be" (2002, 252). The classical tradition of hermeneutics, how-
ever, is based on exactly the opposite assumption: here the aesthetic value
of a literary work is directly proportional to the processing effort it requires'
This is the case not only with avant-garde literature or culturally distant writ-
ing but also, more trivially, with issues such as narrative progression, tension,
surprise, curiosity, and suspense (Phelan 1989; Sternberg200l Baroni 2007,
2077;Toolan 2008).
Anyhow, unlike Pratt, I would add that not all narratives obey the same
rules. Instead, we can oppose two different prototypes whose differences rely
precisely on the way they deal with the rules guiding ordinary communica-
tion. As I argued above, this difference does not cofl'espond to the categories
of the factual and the flctional, or to what other authors have labeled the
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simulated experience. During its progressive actuaTization, the narrative
representation will appear as the representation of real or invented events in
a still-unresolved state, so that they look like some kind of (re)enactment of
those events. To achieve this, the narrator will introduce apparently useless
information, because it has the power to increase the reality effect of the
scene and to delay its resolution.
Of course, even if they seem opposed, or almost contradictory, the two
poles of the configuring and the mimetic are connected by a continuum' Most
genres draw their effects from a blend of both principles-fiom what Marie
Vanoost calls "the close interaction between the two functions of narative,
the intriguing and the configuring":
Moreover, the role each function plays-or the way they are used-also varies,
and not necessarily as one might expeÇt. A narrative that largely uses temporary
uncertainties to recreate a form of experience can nonetheless incline towards
concordance through the way it shapes the events, even in its headline and its
very first sentenÇes. A very informative narative about a rather dry topic such
as science can be organized according to a plot and play on narrative tension'
A narrative about a most outrageous story can allow some kind of nuance by
respecting the complexity of people and life. (2013,94)
Besides, as stated by Monika Fludernik, "experientiality includes this sense
of moving with time, of the now of experience, but this almost static level of
temporal experience is supplemented by more dynamic and evaluative fac-
tors" (1996, 29).The reader can, in other words, expect that the resolution
will display some meaningful picture of the story as a whole, while simulta-
neously accepting "delays" and "concealment of inlbrmation" (Prieto-Pablos
1998, 100) as an exciting challenge.
Nevertheless, there is a clear difference between a narrative whose pri-
mary purpose is to configure knowledge and a mimetic narrative: in the
latter case, the narrator cooperates with the audience by doing everything
possible to increase the tension of the discourse, And in the case of a
novel, we could easily calm our anxiety by reading the last pages of the
book, but we usually avoid doing so because we want to play the game
according to the rules, which involve respecting a more or less linear nar-
rative progression. Even when the story is over, the audience of a mimetic
narrative can be satisfied with an ambiguous ending, because the purpose
of the representation was not to give an explanation, or even to convey a
clear and obvious message, but to achieve some immersive effects, lead-
ing to the production of a cathartic anxiety, empathy, or ethical perplexity'
Mimetic narratives are usually open to an iniinite process of interpretation:
they were intentionally designed for that purpose, and the audience rec-
ognizes this intention as relevant in the ongoing interaction of the reading
process.
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REDEFINITION OF CP AND RT ADAPTED
TO INTRIGUING NARRATIVES
on these grounds, we can rephrase new rules governing discursive coopera-
tion in predominantly mimetic narrative. In this case, the guiding principles
of interaction seem to systematically contradict the cooperative principle
outlined by Grice.
Quantity: Give either too little or too much information, so that your audience
has to guess what is happening or what will happen next.
Relation: Increase the processing effort of the audience; enhance the diffi-
culty of making inferences about the story, at least until its linal sentences.
Manner: Avoid clarity; be prolix, disordered, and at all costs obscure and
ambiguous.
In some popular fictions, like adventure stories, Gothic novels, horror, fan-
tasy, or science fiction, there may also be an inverted "maxim of quality" that
could be rephrased as:
QuaLity: Tell, as if it were true, what you know to be farse, impossible, incred-
ible, or even unthinkable.
concerning the guiding principles underlying the relevance theory outlined
by sperber and wilson, we would also have to redeflne the most important
parameter:
other things being equal, the greater the processing effort required, the more
relevant the narrative will be. The implied meaning of the story should never
be easy to find, and if there is one, it should remain at least partially ambiguous.
The story can, then, be open to a plurality ofinterpretations.
when the meaning of a story is too obvious, it loses most of its mimetic quali-
ties. The reason for this is often either that the author is untalented or that
the story serves a different level of argumentation, as in educational fables,
political discourse, or propaganda. In fact, the flouting of the rules guiding
mimetic discourse makes sense only if the nanative serves some other kind
of discourse whose purpose is dominant in the interaction.s
some authors have tried to use the o'normal version" of relevance theory in
order to explain the functioning of narrative suspense, but in order to do so
they had to interpret it as a retrospective effect, which seems absurd. The case
is obvious, for instance, if we look at the explanation given by Seiji uchida:
To put the reader in a state of suspense means to increase his or her processing
effort. However, given the presumption of relevance, no unjustifiable effort
should be clemanded: there should be contextual effects to offset the processing
effort though they might be a delay in the availability of these effects' . ' ' This
effect would often be retroactive . . , : when readers find the answer and are set
free from the state of suspense, they will return to the point where they initially
entered suspense and interpret the text again in the light of the newly obtained
perspective. (1998, 164)
Uchida concedes that suspense increases the "processing effort" of the reader,
but in order to save the relevance of this apparently uncooperative way of tell-
ing a story, he postulates that "no unjustifiable effort should be demanded," that
suspense is not "long lasting," and that, eventually, the reader will be rewarded
by a retroactive "contextual effect" (168). I would rather argue that suspense does
not have to serve any other purpose than the enjoyable anxiety it immediately
provokes, nor does it have to be resolved. Mimetic naratives aim to elicit the
experience of a storyworld, and to immerse the audience in medias res in an unpre-
dictable action, which necessarily involves increasing their "processing efforts."
Suspense is per se proactive, not retroactive; it doesn't have to become
meaningful at alater stage of the reading; and its resolution is not necessary
for the reader, because delayed information is often meaningless or simply
disappointing. In adventure stories, even though we know that the hero must
prevail, we appreciate the challenge of an intentionally complex narration.
Referring back to my artiflcial example, even if we still don't know the
health condition of the mother by the end of the story, we can still appreciate
the Etzzling-and in that sense meaningful-structure of the narrative. The
interpretation that the narrator is sadistic or crazy is secondary compared with
the experience of suspense and surprise that the narrative immediately con-
veys. In more complex mimetic nalratives, suspense is not only a way to play
with the audience, but more profoundly, it is a way to imitate the temporal
orientation of the unresolved events of life, and in doing so to learn how to
cope with this inevitable dimension of human existence.
If we restrict the concept of narrativity [o a quality that transforms a merely
narative account into a mimetic one, I would agree with Monika Fludernik
that we should focus on experientiality and not on the logical structure of
the fabula, In accordance with this restricted deflnition-which does not
include what I have called "configuring narratives"-Fludernik considers that
"historical writing and action reports are not actually narrative in the fullest
sense" (1996,26).My own definition, however, postulates that "mimetic nar-
ratives," as opposed to "configuring narratives," should be considered a kind
of "uncooperative discourse." Yet, on another level, they are coopgrative,
because they follow specific rules. These rules are similar to those we find
in jokes or role games: they correspond to the sort of playful, and sometimes
openly deceptive, use of language that Jean-Marie Schaeffer calls "intended
playful pretense" ("feintise ludique partagée") (1999) or the economy of
'ocostly signs" ("signaux coûteux") (2009).
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To summari ze: on the one hand, if we want to apply relevance theory to
mimetic narratives, we should accept that the general principles underly-
ing relevance theory must be reset in order to correspond to the purpose
of these specific "intentional-communicative artefacts" (currie 2010, xvii).
on the other hand, it would be reductive to restrict every kind of narrative
representation to the purposes guiding mimetic narratives. Some configuring
narratives mostly obey the ordinary rules defined by relevance theory. For
example, when a witness is interrogated by a judge, not only is the truthful-
ness of her or his story crucial but also the strict observance of all Gricean
maxims. Even implicit communication or irony should be avoided, as well
as any rhetorical strategies that would increase the processing effort of the
addressee. otherwise, we can guess that the judge might react violently, and
he or she would find ways to regulate the interaction by using authority.
we find an interesting.example of uncooperative testimony in the novel
The widow Lerouge, by Émile Gaboriau. In the scene in question, Daburon,
a judge seeking to elicit crucial information from the husband of the victim
conceming the murder of Mrs. Lerouge, sets some explicit constraints on the
discourse: "'In what intrigues did your wife mingle?' asked he. ,Go on, my
friend, tell me everything exactly; here, you know, we must have not only
the truth, but the whole truth,"' (Gaboriau 1863, chap. xvii). unfortunately,
Mr. Lerouge, despite his goodwill, proves a poor witness, He tells his story
"with difficulty, laboriously unscrambling his recollections," and very often
the "the worthy fellow" appears "lost in the midst of his recollections." The
magistrate, constantly obliged "to bring him back into the right path," is "boil-
ing over with impatience," moving "impatiently in his chair" and constantly
urging the narrator to o'Go on, go on." At the end of the testimony, the judge
even responds to another digression of Mr. Lerouge's with "a heavy blow of
his fist on the table."
If we admit that ideal testimony should produce a story that helps to
clarify the past, or, in Ricæurian terms, that the narrative should be a con-
figuration shaping a coherent story, we should regard Mr. Lerouge,s speech
act as unsuccessful, because his narrative produces unintentional tensions
in the interaction instead of resolving them. But as this story is embedded
in a fiction, it in fact achieves the purpose of a mimetic narrative, and its
"relevance" can be saved at a second level of interpretation, because the dif-
ficulties experienced by the judge appear intentional to the reader: they are
the direct consequence of the emplotment decided by the author. The judge,s
reactions can be understood as a diffracted mirror of the reader's experience,
the crucial differences lying in the connotation of the emotions. Thus we read
that "M. Daburon was confounded. Since the beginning of this sad affair, he
had encountered surprise after surprise. Scarcely had he got his ideas in order
on one point, when all his attention was directed to another. He felt himself
utterly routed. What was he about to learn now?" (Gaboriau 1863, chap. xvii).
The erratic progression through the story, involving the fundamental question
"'What are we about to learn now?" may be either frustrating or enjoyable.
The best way to discriminate between judge and reader, between the role of
relevance in configuring and in mimetic narratives, is probably to ask what
determines . . . the tonality of the pathos of this question.
1. On the importance of framing operations for the interpretation of values, see
Korthals Altes (2014).
2. See Sternberg (2001).
3. For instance, Weinrich (1973) defines naration (Erziihlen) as a discourse pro-
duced in a quiet environment, whose aim is to compensate a situation of apathy by
immersing the audience in a narrative world where internal tensions can be experi-
enced. Conversely, Bronckart (1996) opposes this kind of "narration" (a type that I
would call "mimetic") to a more interactive form of storytelling (le "récit interactif")
that has direct implications for the actual situation of the narrator and his audience
(159). In French, the opposition between "passé simple" and "passé composé" reflects
this distinction. Accordingly, Fludemik opposes "report" to "narrative storytelling":
"Report is used simply to summarize or present facts of the çase, to provide informa-
tion" (7996,71).
4. See Phelan (1989); or Booth (1983).
5. See the reflections on the "death of the author" in Barthes' The Rustle of Lan-
guage.Barthes later changed his mind on this point.
6. As I have shown (Baroni 2010; Baroni 2017,25-36), Ricæur's position con-
cerning the possible convergence between emplotment in fictional naratives and
configuration in factual narratives is very ambiguous and changes over time. In the
third volume of Temps et récit, he actually insists on a divergence between the con-
figuration of historical books (which integrate the subjective experience of time of the
agents in the objective time of the calendar and the sources) and the plot of fictions,
which is designed to reveal the aporia of philosophical meditations on time.
7. On the opposition between concordance and discordance, see Ricceur (1983-
1985) or Baroni (2009).
8. On the hierarchy of prototypical heterogeneous sequences like argumentation,
explication, or narration, see Adam (1997). Here I consider configurational naratives
as a kind of "narrative explication," where the explicative function dominates.
Adam, Jean-Michel 1997 . Les Textes: types et prototypes. Pads: Nathan.
Baroni, RaphaëI. 2002. "Incomplétudes stratégiques du discours littéraire et tension
dramatique." Littérature 121 : 105-27.
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Chapter 7
Narrati.g Random Probes
The Ideal of "Slice-of-Life"
Sebastian Domsch
INTRODUCTION: SELECTION AND COMBINATION
when looking at both knowledge and narrative not only as abstract concepts
but also as human practice (in the sense of people doing something with these
concepts), we can see that both are fundamentally reliant on the same two
principles in order to work: selection and combination.
As we will see, concepts like slice-of-life, naturalism, or realism are about
narrative's ability to know something about the world and to communicate
that knowledge. Such concepts relate the knowable to the narratable, but they
also concretize the knowable and the narratable into that which ls known and
that which ls being narrated,
IVhat do I mean by that? Knowledge itself is boundless and timeless, as is
the area of the narratable. There are no boundaries as to what can be known
(or classified as individual kernels of knowledge) both in terms of scope (how
many different things) and of granularity so to speak (down to what levels of
detail), and the same is true for narrative. But in order to practice knowledge
(acquire it, communicate it), it has to be organized, and in order to practice
narrative-as a communicative act-it has to be circumscribed and reduced.
In contrast to the abstract concepts of knowledge and the narratable, both
"organized knowledge" (something that is known to someone, identified as
knowledge, and communicated as such) and performed narrative have a real
existence in time and space-with all the limitations that come with such
an existence. The transformation from the abstract to the concrete, from
the range of the possible to the actualized instance works through two main
principles: selection and combination, that is, a specific ordering of some-
thing that is being selected (for its evocation in language and application to
literary discourse, cf. Jakobson 2007, l70ff .). The acquisition of knowledge
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